This paper is a survey and systematic presentation of decidability and complexity issues for modal and non-modal two-variable logics.
, has the nite model property and is therefore decidable for satis ability. One of the reasons for the signi cance of this result is that many propositional modal logics can be embedded into FO 2 . Logics that are of interest for knowledge representation, for the speci cation and veri cation of concurrent systems and for other areas of computer science are often de ned (or can be viewed) as extensions of modal logics by features like counting constructs, path quanti ers, transitive closure operators, least and greatest xed points etc. Examples of such logics are computation tree logic CTL, the modal -calculus L , or popular description logics used in arti cial intelligence. Although the additional features are usually not rst-order constructs, the resulting logics can still be seen as two-variable logics that are embedded in suitable extensions of FO 2 . Typically, the applications call for an analysis of the satis ability and model checking problems of the logics employed.
The decidability and complexity issues for modal and non-modal two-variables logics have been studied quite intensively in the last years. It has turned out that the satis ability problems for two-variable logics with full rst-order quanti cation are usually much harder (and indeed highly undecidable in many cases) than the satis ability problems for corresponding modal logics. On the other side, the situation is di erent for model checking problems. The model checking problem of a modal logic has essentially the same complexity as the model checking problem of the corresponding two variable logic with full quanti cation.
Introduction
Two-variable logics, more often than not in the disguise of modal logics, are important in many branches of computer science including the speci cation and veri cation of concurrent processes, reasoning about knowledge, arti cial intelligence etc. Indeed, propositional modal logics and their extensions by mechanisms like path quanti ers, transitive closure operators, least and greatest xed points or counting constructs have been studied with great success and have lead to interesting, manageable languages, that meet the essential expressive needs for certain applications. Typically, these applications call for an analysis of the satis ability problem of the logics employed and/or of the complexity of their model checking problems.
The two-variable nature of such languages may be attributed to the fact that they contain propositional modal logic as an essential core { re ecting the eminent role that modal operators (which are viewed here as a restricted form of quanti cation) tend to play in the above-mentioned areas of applications. For many applications, however, rstorder closure properties (i.e. unrestricted quanti cation over element variables) o er an equally desirable direction for extensions. In this case, the embedding of propositional modal logic into FO 2 , i.e. relational rst-order logic with two variables, provides the natural starting point.
In this survey we present an overview of recent results pertaining to logics that lift some of the prominent mechanisms of extension from the modal framework to the framework of two-variable rst-order logic. The most striking overall result is that, with respect to the satis ability problem, two-variable rst-order logic turns out to be not nearly as robust as modal logic. Several seemingly weak extensions of FO 2 in important directions turn out to be highly undecidable. One notable exception is the extension by counting quanti ers, which does provide a decidable common extension of graded modal logic and two-variable rst order logic.
Plan of the paper. In the remainder of this rst section, we discuss a number of two-variable properties and introduce the modal and non-modal two-variable logics that we are going to study. Further, we will make precise the notion of a two-variable logic, based on purely semantic game-theoretic criteria.
In section 2 we survey and explain decidability results for satis ability in two-variable logics. We put the emphasis on the di cult cases, namely two-variable logics with full quanti cation. We present relevant techniques that are used for proving such results and discuss the decidability proofs for FO 2 and C 2 (the extension of FO 2 by counting quanti ers).
In section 3 however, we will see that, in some sense, C 2 is an exception. For most of the other natural common extensions of FO 2 and a modal language like CTL or L , the satis ability problem is undecidable in a very strong sense. We will also relate these problems to the study of the FO 2 -theories of certain interesting model classes, for instance of the class of structures with built-in equivalence relations or built-in wellorderings. We show that already rather modest built-in predicates lead to undecidable FO 2 -theories.
Finally, in section 4 we discuss the complexity of model checking for both modal and non-modal two-variables logics. It turns out that we have here a very di erent situation than for satis ability problems. In all cases that we consider the model checking problem of a modal logic has essentially the same complexity as the model checking problem of the corresponding two variable logic with full quanti cation.
1.1 Examples of two-variable phenomena and two-variable logics
Typical two-variable properties
The following examples are all phrased as monadic queries. In other words, each of them concerns the problem to determine some property of a single element in a given relational structure. To choose a uniform and simple common setting for the structures in the examples, think of directed graphs with two di erent edge predicates, E 1 and E 2 , and with two monadic predicates P 1 and P 2 . Let us write A = (A; E 1 ; E 2 ; P 1 ; P 2 ) for a typical structure of this format, where A is the universe of A. Where we really only need one of the E i or of the P i , we drop the indices and consider e.g. structures A = (A; E; P 1 ; P 2 ) or A = (A; E; P). Input (A; a), where a 2 A, as an instance for one of the sample properties Q is the problem to determine whether a has that property in A. The corresponding monadic query is the class Q of instances (A; a) where a in A does have property Q. Example 1.1 (a) Does a have an outgoing E 1 -edge to a vertex in P?
(b) Do all vertices that can be reached from a by traversing one E 2 -edge have the property described in (a)? (c) Is there an E-path of length 17 from a, which ends in a vertex in P? Example 1.2 (a) Is there an incoming E-edge at a? (b) Is there a vertex linked to a by both an E 1 -edge and an E 2 edge? (c) Is every vertex in P reachable from a on an E-path of length at most 3? Example 1.3 (a) Is it possible to reach P from a on an E-path?
(b) Do all E-paths from a eventually hit P 1 , and before hitting P 1 only pass through vertices in P 2 .
Example 1.4 Think of A = (A; E) as the board for a two-person game, in which players move a single pebble on A according to the following rules. Players take alternate moves, player I begins. In their moves, players move the pebble from its current position along some E-edge. Who gets stuck rst, loses the game (the opponent wins).
(a) Does player I have a winning strategy in the game on A if the pebble is initially placed on a? (b) Is the game on (A; a) necessarily nite?
The GAME-problem 1.4 (a) is well known for being Ptime-complete. Property (b) is of independent conceptual interest as it concerns the well-foundedness of the converse E ?1 of E at a. Example 1.5 (a) Is E deterministic, i.e. are E-successors at all vertices unique? (b) Is A (isomorphic with) the full binary tree with left and right successors E 1 and E 2 ? (c) Can you be sure to reach P from a on an E-path of length at most 3, if some adversary may block one E-edge in each step?
(d) In the GAME-problem of Example 1.4, is the strategy for player I unique?
However di erent these problems are, one thing they all have in common is that to determine these properties one would in principle never have to investigate more than two vertices of the underlying structure at the same time { provided that, for some of these properties, one can keep on the side certain records of auxiliary properties or of numbers of pairs already inspected, et cetera. This is something that distinguishes these properties crucially from a property like for instance triangle-freeness of a graph, which would intuitively require inspection of triples of vertices. We will show below that the properties in the above examples are de nable in natural two-variable logics. We shall also see that there are purely semantic criteria to prove that these are two-variable properties, in a sense that makes the remark about only checking pairs of vertices at any one time precise.
Some typical two-variable logics
We review and introduce a number of prominent two-variable logics, and, by way of indicating their expressive power, apply them to the formalization of those two-variable properties given in the examples. For the most part we may assume we are dealing with a standard relational vocabulary consisting of binary predicates E 1 , E 2 , : : : , and monadic predicates P 1 , P 2 , : : :
Modal logic ML Think of structures A = (A; E 1 ; : : : ; P 1 ; : : : ) as Kripke structures, regarding their elements as possible worlds, the binary E i as accessibility relations, and the monadic P i as basic propositions. The syntax and semantics of (propositional) modal logic ML concerns formulae ' asserting a property of worlds a in some A: (A; a) j = '. The modal -calculus L L extends ML with a least xed point constructor. Starting from atomic modal formulae including atoms for propositional variables X; Y; : : : , the syntax of L is obtained as the closure under (i) Boolean connectives :,^, _, (ii) modal quanti cation: if ' is a formula then so are 2 i ' and 3 i ', (iii) least xed points: if '(X) is a formula that is positive in X, then X ' is a formula.
Semantics of L : The semantics naturally extends that of ML, with the following stipulations for the -operator. Over A, the set X '] A := fa : (A; a) j = X 'g is the least subset S of the universe satisfying the xed-point equation S = fa : (A; a) j = '(S)g.
Equivalently, this xed point may be obtained as the limit of an inductively de ned monotone sequence of subsets S indexed by ordinals . The S are known as the stages in the generation of the xed point: S 0 = ?, S +1 = a : (A; a) j = '(S ) , and S = S < S in limits . Then X '] A = S S = S 0 , for 0 the least ordinal such that S 0 +1 = S 0 (note that 0 , the closure ordinal of the xed point, depends on the underlying structure A). 1 If there is only one accessibility E, one simply writes 2 and 3.
One could additionally introduce greatest xed points without increasing the expressive power, since least and greatest xed points are related by a straightforward duality.
L is essentially contained in ML 1 , in the sense that for every cardinality there is a translation of L -formulae into ML 1 that is sound over all structures whose cardinality is bounded by . The reason for this is that the stages of a xed point can inductively be shown to be ML 1 -de nable. Once a uniform bound on the closure ordinal is known, the xed point itself is ML 1 -de nable, just as stage S . Generally, and over arbitrarily large structures no such bound is available (and the formal disjunction over the de ning formulae for all S is not admitted even in ML 1 , because they do not form a set).
For some concrete examples of expressibility in L consider the properties in Examples 1.3 and 1.4. The existence of a strategy for player I in Example 1.4 (a) is expressed by the formula X 32X. Indeed, I playing from b has a strategy to win in one move if (A; b) j = 32?. The set of such b is precisely the rst stage w.r.t. the xed point X 32X. Inductively, I has a strategy to win from b in n + 1 moves if there is a move for I such that, no matter which counter-move II chooses, I's next move is made from a position in which I has a strategy to win in n moves; the 23-construct precisely captures this, in the transition from stage n to stage n + 1. For Example 1.4 (b), note that the game is necessarily nite if and only if there is no in nite E-path from a, which is expressed by (A; a) j = X 2X.
Two-variable rst-order FO 2 and its in nitary variant L 2 1! Two-variable rstorder logic FO 2 is just the fragment of ordinary rst-order FO (with equality), whose formulae only use variable symbols x and y (free or bound). It is easy to express the properties of Example 1.2 in FO 2 .
As for modal logic, we also consider an in nitary variant L 2 1! , which is closed under conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of formulae.
Modal versus rst-order Note that ML may be embedded into FO 2 (and ML 1 into L 2 1! ) through an inductive translation ' 7 ! ' (x) according to (P i ) (x) = P i x; (3 i Is there any way to specify what it means for a property to be a two-variable property { in some more fundamental sense? Since the notion of a property is a semantic one it would be desirable to obtain a semantic speci cation, one that directly deals with properties rather than with their formalizations in speci c logical languages. The basic intuition is that being two-variable corresponds to being checkable in a successive analysis of pairs of elements from the structure, rather than requiring some larger simultaneous view of the structure. In other words, a property cannot be two-variable if it distinguishes between structures which are indistinguishable at the level of such successive analysis of pairs. Of course, the right notion of successive analysis of pairs needs to be formalized, through some a set of rules or some protocol. These considerations suggest the use of logical games, which are a classical tool to capture notions of similarity or indistinguishability of structures, for the desired kind of protocol. Consider the two-variable variant of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game, i.e. the standard two-pebble game. This game is played by two players, I and II, on two relational structures A and B. A current position in the game is given by two pairs of designated elements, one pair in each structure. Think of these pairs as currently pebbled by two pairs of marked pebbles, one pair for each structure. The rules of the game admit the relocation of pebbles within their structure. The basic information in a current position is the isomorphism type of the one-or two-element substructures speci ed by the pebbled elements. The two structures A and B can be proved di erent if I has a strategy to conduct the sequence of moves in the game into a position in which the currently marked two-element substructures are di erent. In other words, the only way to make a structural di erence between A and B manifest, is by pinning it down to some di erence at the level of currently inspected pairs of elements { which is in good agreement with the intuition of two-variable properties. It remains to specify the set of rules by which the players may move pebbles, and this is where some interesting variations come up. These variations give rise to di erent avours of the notion of two-variables. The single round in the standard two-pebble game follows these rules:
I chooses one pebble in one of the structures and moves it to some element of that structure.
II responds by moving the corresponding pebble on the opposite structure. In all the games to be considered here it will be the case that exactly one of I and II has a winning strategy (in any given position), i.e. all these games are determined. The ability of player II to respond to challenges of I is a measure for the similarity of the underlying positions over A and B. The ability to maintain (W) for more rounds and in response to all manoeuvres of I requires a higher degree of similarity of the initial positions. Indeed, the standard two-pebble game just outlined is well known to be a measure for the expressive power of two-variable rst-order logic FO 2 and its in nitary variant L 2 Instead of restricting I we may relax the conditions to obtain a weaker notion of equivalence that corresponds to the logical strength of modal logic rather than rstorder. Recall the main di erences: modal quanti cation is restricted to locally accessible vertices, and at the atomic level only monadic predicates (namely the basic propositions) are made available. In view of the latter, the game may actually be thought of as a onepebble game, and the binary predicates (accessibilities) enter in the rules for the single round which are to re ect the locality of modal quanti cation.
In a position (A; a; B; b) II selects one of the accessibility relations and one of the structures, say E i and B; I has to submit a function from E 1 -accessible elements in B to E 1 II responds by moving the pebble in the opposite structure along an E i -edge.
The less symmetric version of the game given above, and comparison with the corresponding formulation of the standard two-pebble game, immediately show that twopebble equivalence implies bisimulation equivalence: the functions f, which II submits in the two-pebble game, obviously have to respect any accessibility relations E i if II is not to fail the winning condition (W) immediately. But then the restrictions of f to sets of the form E i a] are good for the bisimulation game.
In di erent contexts, the idea of bisimulation equivalence was proposed by van Benthem 3] and by Milner 27] . The following modal Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e Theorem is due to van Benthem. Taking the game protocols as natural formalizations of what it means that a property is essentially checkable in recourse to pairs of elements, we obtain a semantic characterization of two-variable properties, with an additional classi cation according to two main distinctions: modal vs. two-pebble, and counting vs. no counting. The maximal expressive power in the four resulting areas is represented by the in nitary logics ML 1 graded ML 1 , L 2 1! and C 2 1! , at least when we restrict attention to any set-theoretically bounded domain of structures 2 . Note that C 2 1! is the most expressive among these logics, ML 1 the least expressive, and L 2 1! and graded ML 1 intermediate and incomparable. We may view these logics as the basic framework for the study of two-variable properties. bisimulation bisim.+ctg.
2-pebble 2-pebble+ctg.
The point of this restriction is only to make sure that we are always dealing with a set of isomorphism types of structures rather than a proper class. In the context of actual applications this would always seem to be granted.
A classi cation of the basic examples according to these four avours of two-variable properties essentially follows from the formalizations in respective standard two-variable logics given above. An exercise concerning the games would show that, according to the distinctions made here, those formalizations were adequate in the sense that e.g. counting is indeed necessary to deal with the properties in Example 1.5 (they are not de nable in L 2 1! ), or that those in Example 1.2, and (a) and (b) of Example 1.5 are not modal (they are not de nable in graded ML 1 ).
Proviso As a general proviso for the entire paper, all structures considered are in purely relational vocabularies. Constants could for the most part be admitted without changing the major results; functions, however, have to be excluded if the restriction to two variables is to make sense. In view of the game characterizations we shall further assume from now on that the arity of relation symbols is at most 2. Essentially this is no loss of generality for our purposes: an inspection of the two-pebble games shows that atoms involving more than two elements cannot matter; this observation may actually be turned into a reduction which replaces for instance two-element atoms for higher-arity relations through the introduction of new binary relations. Similar to the situation discussed for L , de nability of the stages in L 2 1! shows that FP 2 L 2 1! over any class of structures of uniformly bounded cardinality. This restricted inclusion is su cient, however, to guarantee that FP 2 is a two-variable logic in the sense that it is preserved under two-variable equivalence. It is essential for these considerations that the application of the xed-point operator is restricted to formulae '(X; x) in which y does not occur free 15]. Two-variable transitive closure logic TC 2 The fact that the expressive power of below reveals that it is not a two-variable logic in the sense of the previous section. Observe that of the two graphs involved in that example, one is transitive and the other is not. Example 1.9 The following two structures with re exive and symmetric E are equivalent w.r.t. the two-pebble game with counting: a universe of six vertices arranged in one cycle w.r.t. E, and a universe of six vertices which splits into two 3-cycles w.r.t. E.
More examples of two-variable logics
It follows that TC 2 is not a two-variable logic in the strict sense. Computation tree logic CTL For the typical interpretation of CTL as a branching time logic one usually considers structures with a single binary predicate E (with the intended meaning of temporal successor, or a non-deterministic next-step-operation). The syntax and semantics of CTL is divided between so-called state formulae and path formulae. State formulae are interpreted as describing properties of single vertices (states), i.e. as de ning monadic queries. Path formulae on the other hand describe properties of maximal E-paths. An E-path is maximal if it has no proper extension, i.e. if it is in nite or if it terminates in a vertex without E-successors. 3 Let us write state formulae as formulae ', and path formulae as (p) where p is treated as a formal variable ranging over maximal paths p = a 0 a 1 a 2 : : : where (a i ; a i+1 ) 2 E. The syntax of CTL is de ned in a simultaneous induction on state and program formulae: (i) P i is a state formula, for each basic predicate P i , and so are ? and >.
(ii) Boolean combinations of state formulae are state formulae. It is customary with CTL to restrict attention to structures in which every E-path extends in nitely. Our slightly more general convention is more suited to the study of natural extensions of CTL; also we do not lose any of the standard in nite-paths semantics, because terminal vertices are de ned by the ML-formula 2?. To give some examples, consider the properties in Example 1.3: (a) is expressed by 9p(>untilP), and (b) by 8p(P 2 until P 1 ).
We are here interested in the semantics of CTL only for state formulae and correspondingly regard the path formulae just as auxiliary constructs in the inductive de nition of syntax and semantics. It is instructive to review the translation of CTL (meaning its state formulae) into L , which in particular shows that CTL is a two-variable logic of modal type. Inductively the translation is obtained as follows. With (i) and (ii) we trivially remain within ML. (iii) and (iv) 
This equivalence is easily veri ed through comparison of the stages of the respective least xed points (again, the disjunct 2? is necessary only in our relaxed framework where maximal E-paths need not a priori be in nite). Thus 8 de nes the well-founded part of the converse of the relation de ned by .
It follows that over nite structures, CTL translates into TC 2 . The obvious TC 2 -translation of 9 , ' 2 (x) _ 9y ? TC ? Exy^' 1 (x) (x; y)^' 2 (y) 4 The conjunct :2? takes care of the possible termination of maximal paths, in our more general setting; it could be dropped under the standard assumption that all E-paths are in nitely extendible.
is actually valid over arbitrary structures. And 8 , being a well-foundedness statement, is equivalent with a TC 2 -formula just over nite structures by Example 1.10. Immerman and Vardi 22] extend the inclusion CTL TC 2 over nite structures from CTL to CTL . CTL is a variant of CTL with somewhat nicer closure properties since it admits Boolean combinations of path formulae and non-trivial nesting of temporal operators`until' and next'. To capture the semantics of CTL state formulae they have to use a further extension of TC 2 , where transitive closures may involve several Boolean variables along with the usual two element variables. For model checking complexity, this translation proves to be more useful than the standard translation to L .
Actually the speci c fragment of L needed to capture CTL and its natural lift to the FO 2 -framework, are also rather interesting. Indeed one may propose the following extension, rather than TC 2 , as a natural candidate to extend both FO 2 Clearly CL 2 FP 2 , whence CL 2 is indeed a true two-variable logic. Also, by the considerations outlined above, CTL CL 2 , in a translation that is sound over arbitrary structures. Again, these inclusions are strict.
We have thus isolated the natural candidates to lift the chain of extensions ML CTL L to the level of FO 2 within the framework of two-variable logics. It is not hard to see that indeed CL 2 is the natural least common extension of FO 2 and CTL, and FP 2 the natural least common extension of FO 2 and L , under some reasonable closure conditions.
We shall see in Section 3, however, that even these minimal lifts of extremely wellbehaved extensions of ML to the level of FO 2 turn out to be undecidable for satis ability.
Decidability results
Consider a class of formulae X. Those subclasses of X that come up in the classical decision problem for X are the following.
sat(X), consisting of those ' 2 X that have a model; n-sat(X), consisting of those ' 2 X that have a nite model; inf-axioms(X) = sat(X) n n-sat(X), the in nity axioms of X; non-sat(X) = X n sat(X), consisting of the unsatis able ' 2 X.
X has the nite model property if every satis able formula in X even has a nite model: sat(X) = n-sat(X). The nite model property is a crucial model theoretic property of many (but not all) classes X for which sat(X) is decidable (see 8]). Note that for every recursive formula class X FO, the nite model property of X implies that sat(X) is decidable. Indeed sat(X) is then recursively enumerable (since n-sat(X) trivially is), and by the completeness theorem for rst-order logic, also non-sat(X) is recursively enumerable. An easy model theoretic proof for the decidability of propositional modal logic ML, for instance, uses the nite model property of ML and the embedding of ML into FO 2 and hence into FO. Indeed FO 2 itself has the nite model property 26]. The prominent process logics extending ML are decidable and also share the nite model property; e.g. see 24] for L . On the other hand, none of the corresponding extensions of FO 2 retains the nite model property; see 15] for in nity axioms in TC 2 , FP 2 , C 2 and others. It is important to realize, however, that violation of the nite model property does by no means rule out decidability of either n-sat(X), or sat(X), or both.
If nevertheless most interesting extensions of FO 2 , with the notable exception of C 2 , fail to be decidable, this should not be blamed on the failure of the nite model property, but on the failure of the so-called tree model property. The tree model property requires that every satis able formula has a tree-like model, a phenomenon that is well known in modal logics. Vardi 38] argues convincingly that the tree model property provides the crucial tools { namely the sophisticated use of tree-automata { to prove decidability (along with good complexity bounds) in the context of modal process logics. The surprising robustness of ML under extensions can thus be attributed to the modal character of these typical extensions. Indeed, the tree model property follows from preservation under bisimulation equivalence, whence all two-variable logics of the modal type share the tree model property. FO 2 on the other hand does not have the tree model property.
In this section we deal with decidability results concerning FO 2 (having the nite model property, but not the tree model property), and C 2 (having neither the nite nor the tree model property).
Skolemization and Scott's normal form
Explicitly working with FO 2 we review a common technique for reducing quanti er complexity while preserving satis ability. The basic idea, also known as Skolemization, is to substitute new predicate names for subformulae together with formulae that guarantee the soundness of this substitution. This method has been applied by Scott 34] in 1962 to give an elegant reduction of the satis ability problem for FO 2 to the G odel case (the 8 2 9 -pre x class) with equality of the classical decision problem. At that time, G odel's claim that his decidability proof for the 8 2 9 -pre x class without equality could be extended`without di culty' to formulae containing equality was still believed to be true. Thus, Scott's reduction seemed to imply the decidability of the satis ability problem for FO 2 . Although it turned out later that G odel's claim was false (see 8]), Scott's reduction became an essential preparatory step in all subsequent proofs of the decidability of FO 2 and with slight modi cations carries over to many extensions of FO 2 that have been considered, and in particular to C 2 .
Consider the lowest level of quanti er introduction in an FO 2 -formula. Up to trivial exchange of variables, we are dealing with one of the following formulae, where displayed variables are actually free and 0 quanti er-free: (x) = 9y 0 (x; y), (x) = 8y 0 (x; y), = 9y 0 (y), or = 8y 0 (y). In the case of the rst two, with one remaining free variable, we introduce a new unary predicate P with intended semantics P x $ (x).
It is readily checked that this stipulation is captured by the following simple FO 2 -assertions of quanti er depth 2: If (x) of either of these forms appears as a subformula of some ', then satis ability of ' is equivalent with satis ability of ' 0^ , where ' 0 is the result of substituting P x for every occurrence of the subformula (x) in '.
In the cases where does not retain any free variables we similarly may simulate the Boolean value of with the use of a unary predicate P and a dummy constant c (which will be eliminated in the end). Now is to be substituted by P c, and for the semantic adequacy of this substitution we add assertions similar to the above: Again, we obtain satis ability equivalence between ' and ' 0 c^ , where ' 0 is the result of substituting P c for subformulae throughout '.
Starting with an arbitrary sentence ' 2 FO 2 and applying this procedure ' 7 ! ' 0 recursively to the minimal subformulae of quanti er depth 1, and collecting conjuncts along the way, we nally obtain a quanti er-free FO 2 As mentioned above, this reduction extends to C 2 . It turns out that also here quanti er pre xes can be reduced to the form 88 and 89 >n , 89 6n , respectively 89 =n with a normal form mapping which is linearly bounded w.r.t. formula length. A further and very useful reduction proceeds to eliminate all forms of counting quanti ers apart from the very limited 9 =1 . This additional reduction step is achieved essentially by paving satisfaction sets with new singleton sets rendered by new predicates. For example, observe that 9 >n x (x) is faithfully rendered by the conjunction of 8x(( W n i=1 P i x) ! (x), 8x V i6 =j :(P i x^P j x), and V n i=1 9 =1 xP i x, for new P i . Note, however, that if n is assumed to be encoded in binary in the formula 9 >n x (x) as usual, then the resulting formula is exponentially longer, as we introduce n new predicates. The reduction is computable in exponential time and may increase the formula length exponentially. There also exists a similar but weaker normal form that admits conjuncts of the form 8x9 >n y i and 8x9 6n y i for arbitrary n which is computable in polynomial time and remains linearly bounded in terms of formula length.
Finding the`right' models
A key step in the decidability proofs for FO 2 , C 2 and related logics consists in passing from arbitrary models to models whose structure is su ciently regular, so that there is a recursive combinatorial criterion for checking whether such special, regular models exist. The cleanest such approach is exempli ed in the treatment of FO 2 . FO 2 does possess the nite model property, i.e. sat(FO 2 ) = n-sat(FO 2 ). In fact there is a recursive f, f(') exponentially bounded in the length of ', such that any FO 2 -sentence ' that is satis able at all, also has a model of size at most f('). One usually refers to this as a small model property. We may thus use as special models for a sentence ' its small models, namely those whose size is bounded by f('). Whether ' has such a special model is clearly recursive (here actually in Nexptime). The small model property guarantees that the f(') size bounded structures are fully representative as a class of candidate models for '.
In the case of C 2 one is not quite as lucky, since C 2 does not have the nite model property: there are satis able C 2 -sentences without nite models. For instance, the conjunction of 8x9 =1 yExy, 8y9 61 xExy, and 9y8x:Exy says that E is the graph of a function that is 1{1 but not onto. Hence a representative class of special models for C 2 -sentences has to comprise in nite models. It turns out that su ciently homogeneous models are always available. These admit nite descriptions, from which one can then abstract recursive criteria for satis ability in in nite models.
Basic types as building blocks
Consider FO 2 and the normal form of Theorem 2.1. Think of normal form FO 2 -sentences ' in vocabulary ' consisting of nitely many unary and binary predicates. Prenex quanti er rank 2 suggests to analyze models in terms of quanti er-free 1-and 2-types. A basic 1-type, respectively basic 2-type, in a nite and purely relational vocabulary , is a maximally consistent nite set of atomic and negated atomic formulae in the single variable x, respectively in variables x and y. For 2-types we also require :x = y rather than x = y to be a member. Clearly, for any xed, nite and relational vocabulary, there are only nitely many di erent basic 1-and 2-types: their numbers are actually exponentially bounded in the number of predicates in . Let and stand for the sets of basic 1-and 2-types, respectively.
An element a of a structure A realizes the basic 1-type = tp A (a) consisting of just those (negated) atomic formulae that a satis es in A. Similarly for a non-degenerate pair (a; b) and its basic 2-type = tp A (a; b). Let the sets A and A be the sets of all basic 1-types, respectively 2-types realized in A. It is clear that for any quanti er-free FO 2 -formula the sets = 2 : j = , respectively = 2 : j = are easily computable from and . Furthermore, any 2-type uniquely determines the 1-types j x and j y of its x-and y-component.
Obviously . Any structure A can be completely speci ed by allocating basic 2-types in a consistent manner to all pairs of elements. Here, consistency means, that the 2-types allocated to pairs with a common element assign the same 1-type to that element. Viewing basic types in this way as the building blocks of a model, we nd that 0 poses a global constraint on the 2-types that may be realized in A, while the other i require witnesses, in the sense that certain 1-types must always be extendible to appropriate 2-types.
Actually, A (respectively 0 ) put some non-trivial conditions about basic 1-types (the trivial ones are those that determine the 1-types as the restrictions of the 2-types):
2 A is realized only once in A if and only if there is no 2 A such that j x = j y = . It has become customary to call an element of a structure a king if its 1-type is realized by no other element of that structure; accordingly the 1-type of a king is royal. We are looking for some B j = ' (a small model for '), where jBj is exponentially bounded in j'j. B is obtained from A in several steps as follows. Recall that j j is exponentially bounded in the number of predicates, and therefore in j'j.
Regular witnessing patterns
The kings: Let K A be the substructure whose universe K consists of just the set of kings in A. Clearly jKj 6 j j.
The court: For the 89-requirements at kings, select witnesses a k;i in A such that A j = i k; a k;i ]. Let C A be the substructure whose universe is C = K fa k;i : k 2 K; 1 6 i 6 mg. Clearly jCj 6 (m + 1)j j. The nite model property of FO 2 , and hence the decidability of sat(F O 2 ), was established by Mortimer 26] . (Scott's reduction to the G odel case implies the decidability and nite model property for the equality-free part of FO 2 .) A doubly-exponential bound on the size of a minimal model is implicit in Mortimer's proof. The arguments outlined here, due to Gr adel, Kolaitis and Vardi 14] , provide an exponential upper bound on the model size. This implies that the satis ability problem for FO 2 
Decidability of sat(C 2 )
Recall that C 2 does not share the nite model property, so that any decidability proof for C 2 has to take into account in nite models. As C 2 FO, the complement of sat(C 2 ) is recursively enumerable by FO-completeness. n-sat(C 2 ) is trivially recursively enumerable. Hence, for decidability of sat(C 2 ) it actually su ces to show that also the class of those C 2 -sentences that have in nite models is recursively enumerable.
Again we may view the essential step as an analysis of arbitrary (in nite) models A of some normal form C 2 -sentence ' which leads to the construction of some special (here: especially regular and homogeneous) model B j = '. The class of special models can be chosen such that the set of those normal form C 2 -sentences that are satis ed in special models becomes recursively enumerable. This immediately also provides an enumeration of inf-sat(C 2 ), thus proving sat(C 2 ) decidable.
Recall the normal form of Theorem 2. Let us outline the passage from some in nite A j = ' to the more regular B j = '. We now regard an element of A as a king (and its basic counting type as royal) if its basic counting type is realized in A only nitely often. B is obtained in the following steps. The kings: Let K A be the substructure whose universe K consists of the set of kings in A. As is nite and each royal counting type is realized nitely often, K is nite.
The court: In A n K, nitely many basic counting types are each realized in nitely often. Call a; a 0 2 A n K equivalent, a a 0 , if ctp A (a) = ctp A (a 0 ) and if A (K fag) and A (K fa 0 g) are isomorphic. Let C be the substructure of A whose universe is K together with all nite -classes. As has nite index, C is nite.
Uniform witnessing: AnC consists of nitely many in nite -classes 1 ; : : : ; l , each characterized by its basic counting type and by the basic 2-types its elements realize with kings. We extend C to B over a universe B consisting of C together with countably many new elements for each of the classes j . Basic counting types are put right by a systematic prescription of basic 2-types to pairs (a; b) for suitable b 2 B nC, whenever a has fewer -incidences than its basic counting type requires.
Completion: All he remaining 2-types are settled with appropriate 2 A , to complete the interpretation of B, in such a way that -counts 0, 1, 2 + are preserved at both ends whenever a pair is newly attributed atomic 2-type .
The uniform witnessing can actually be organized such that the recipient b, at the other end of a required -edge at a, is chosen in a uniform way as a minimal as yet unused element in an appropriate class j , where j only depends on the -class of a.
Even more interestingly, the completion step can be handled in an equally uniform manner. A result in the Ramsey theory of complete bipartite graphs gives that, for It is not surprising that, given the regular pattern of the special structures B, there is a nite description of these B on the basis of which one can check (a) consistency of that information as the description of an in nite structure, and (b) whether this structure satis es a given normal form C 2 -sentence '.
Actually (b) is almost trivial, since A alone (recursively) determines the set of those normal form sentences that are satis ed in A. Moreover it is clear that A and its companion B satisfy the same normal form sentences. It is condition (a), which necessitates the rather more involved preparation of B as given above. It turns out that for a characteristic description we can use the following: the full speci cation of the substructures of kings and court, K and C, the speci cation of the in nite classes j , and of the nite classes within C. We do not repeat the combinatorially more involved arguments here, but rather refer to the original source 16]. Summing up, we have indicated the main arguments towards the proof of the rst part of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4 (Gr adel, Otto, Rosen) The satis ability problem for C 2 is decidable.
Also the nite satis ability problem for C 2 is decidable.
Currently the best upper bound on the complexity of sat(C 2 ) is one of nondeterministic doubly-exponential time, established by Pacholski, Szwast and Tendera 32]. There remains a gap between this and the best known lower bound, which actually is just Nexptime (as for FO 2 ). The exponential gap between these bounds, and the corresponding uncertainty about the actual complexity, is closely linked to the exponential blow up encountered in the normal form for C 2 , compare Theorem 2.2. In fact Pacholski, Szwast and Tendera do obtain a Nexptime-decision procedure for normal form C 2 -sentences. Theorem 2.5 (Pacholski, Szwast, Tendera) Satis ability C 2 -sentences in normal form can be decided in Nexptime. It follows that sat(C 2 ) is decidable in nondeterministic doubly-exponential time.
Undecidability results
Modal logics have very robust decidability properties. Extensions of modal logic by temporal operators, least and greatest xed points, counting constructs provide interesting logical systems that are algorithmically quite manageable and important for applications in a number of areas. It turns out that most of the corresponding extensions of FO 2 are undecidable. In particular this is the case for the logics TC 2 and FP 2 which augment FO 2 by weak forms of recursion, such as transitive closure or (restricted) monadic xedpoint operations. Also the extension of FO 2 by cardinality comparison quanti ers or a choice construct, known as Hilbert's "-operator are undecidable. In fact all these logics prove to be undecidable both for satis ability, and for satis ability in nite models. Moreover most of them are hard for 1 1 , the rst level of the analytical hierarchy, and thus have a much higher degree of undecidability than rst-order logic (see 15] for more details).
A closely related issue is the (un)decidability of the FO 2 -theories of certain interesting model classes, de ned by constraints on some of the relation symbols. For instance, let K be the class of structures of the form A = (A; E; R 1 ; R 2 ; : : : ) such that E is an equivalence relation on A (and R 1 ; R 2 ; : : : are arbitrary relations). To put it di erently, K is the closure of the class of equivalence relations (A; E) under expansions. We refer to the FO 2 -theory of K as the FO 2 -theory of one built-in equivalence relation. In contrast, we will prove below that the FO 2 -theory of several built-in equivalence relations is undecidable in a strong sense. We will further show that this can be viewed as a strengthening of the undecidability of TC 2 We are also interested in periodic solutions of domino problems. 5 Z=sZstands for f0; : : : ; s?1g with successor modulo s; this structure is isomorphic with the standard s-cycle.
De nition 3.9 A domino system D is said to admit a periodic tiling if there is a tiling of Z Z by D that has a horizontal and a vertical period s; t > 0 respectively. This means that for all points (x; y) 2 Z Z we have that (x; y) = (x + s; y) = (x; y + t).
A periodic tiling with periods s; t may be pictured as a tiling of a torus Z=sZ Z=tZ obtained from gluing an s t rectangle along the edges.
Berger 6] proved that the domino problem is undecidable. Gurevich and Koryakov 18] strengthened this to an inseparability result. In fact it will be su cient to deal with su ciently rich classes of structures that locally resemble grids. This is made precise in the following de nition. (ii) For every r 2 N there exists a multiple m = kr such that C contains the standard grid G m . Let K be a class of structures that is closed under expansions. That is, K is de ned by imposing semantic conditions on some relations, but is closed under arbitrary variations and additions of other relations. (For instance, consider the case where we have a built-in linear order, or several built-in equivalence relations, but no conditions on other predicates). To prove that the FO 2 -theory of K is strongly undecidable it su ces to present an FO 2 -interpretation of some rich class of local grids in K. The original notion of a ( rst-order) interpretation is due to Tarski 36] . Today, in model theory, interpretations come in many di erent shapes and sizes (see e.g. 20, Chapter 5]). We use here a speci c variant tailored for our particular class of applications. The FO 2 -interpretations that we need are given by sequences I = h (x); "(x; y); ' h (x; y); ' v (x; y)i of FO 2 -formulae in the vocabulary of K. Let B 2 K. I interprets in B a structure I(B) = (A; h; v) with two unary functions provided that the following conditions are satis ed:
(1) B j = 9x (x) (2) Let B := fb : B j = (b)g. The formula "(x; y) de nes an equivalence relation on B that is compatible with ' h and ' v . In other words, " B is a congruence relation on the induced structure ( B ; ' B h ; ' B v ). We write b] to denote the congruence class of an element b 2 B . The set of these congruence classes is the universe of I(B). The conditions (1)- (3) are the admissibility conditions of I on B. They are necessary and su cient for I to de ne in B a structure I(B) with two unary functions h; v.
De nition 3.12 Let K a class of structures that is closed under expansions, and C be a rich class of local grids. We say that FO 2 interprets C in K if there exists an FO 2 -interpretation I = h (x); "(x; y); ' h (x; y); ' v (x; y)i such that (i) On every structure B 2 K, the admissibility conditions for I are satis ed and I(B) is a local grid in C. (ii) For every nite local grid A 2 C there exists a nite B 2 K such that A = I(B). Remark. It is sometimes natural to think of a rich class of local grids being interpreted in a nitely FO 2 -axiomatizable subclass of K. This means that there exists a sentence 2 FO 2 such that only the structures B 2 K with B j = appear in conditions (i) and (ii) above. Suppose that C is a rich class of local grids that contains the trivial grid G 1 with just one node. Note that if FO 2 interprets C in a nitely FO 2 -axiomatizable subclass of K, then FO 2 also interprets C in K. Indeed suppose that I = h (x); "(x; y); ' h (x; y); ' v (x; y)i interprets C in the class axiomatized by . Let I 0 be the interpretation obtained by replacing each formula of I by ! . Then I 0 (B) = I(B) for B j = and I 0 (B) is the trivial grid G 1 for B j = : . Theorem 3.13 Suppose that FO 2 interprets a rich class of local grids in K. Then the FO 2 -theory of K is strongly undecidable.
Proof. Let T be the FO 2 -theory of K and suppose that the FO 2 -interpretation I = h (x); "(x; y); ' h (x; y); ' v (x; y)i interprets a rich class of local grids in K. Given 
Towards a contradiction, assume that some recursive set X separates T n from T.
Then the set Y := fD : : D 2 Xg is also recursive. We claim that Y separates the domino systems that admit a periodic tiling from those that admit no tiling of N N.
To see this, let rst D be a domino system that tiles N N periodically. Then there exists an r 2 N such that D tiles the grid G r , and hence also the grids G kr , for all k. Since B j = D this mapping is well-de ned and provides a correct tiling, contradicting the assumption that D does not tile N N. 2 
Several equivalence relations
Theorem 3.14 The FO 2 -theory of the class of structures with several built-in equivalence relations is strongly undecidable.
Proof. We describe a class K of structures that is nitely FO 2 -axiomatizable inside the class of all structures with four built-in equivalence relations, and show K interprets a rich class of local grids. The result follows by Theorem 3.13. For this purpose we use for each (i; j) 2 f0; 1g f0; 1g
{ an equivalence relation E ij , { a unary relation A ij , { binary relations H ij ; V ij ; D + ij ; D ?
ij .
The idea is that the grids G m (for even numbers m 2 N) are described by structures of this type as follows: We need an FO 2 -axiom that enforces the following conditions:
(1) The universe is the disjoint union of A 00 ; A 01 ; A 10 and A 11 . On the other side, let B be a model of such that the E ij are equivalence relations on the universe B. We claim that I(B) is a local grid. We thus have to prove that the formulae ' h (x; y) and ' v (x; y) de ne commuting functions on B. Again, since E 00 is the re exive and symmetric closure of the union of H 00 , H 01 , V 00 , V 10 , D + 00 and D ? 00 , it follows that hv(b) and vh(b) belong to the same E 00 -equivalence class as b, and hence have to be connected by an edge of one of these kinds. But this is impossible since both hv(b) and vh(b) belong to A 11 . Again the arguments for b in other A ij are analogous. 2 
Transitive closure, well-founded relations, and xed points
The (strong) undecidability of the two-variable theory of several equivalence relations implies a number of further undecidability results. In particular this is the case for the systems TC 2 and FP 2 .
For the two-variable transitive closure logic TC 2 undecidability follows immediately because equivalence relations can be axiomatized in TC 2 .
Corollary 3.15 (Gr adel, Otto, Rosen) The satis ability problem and the nite satis ability problem for TC 2 are undecidable.
In fact sat(TC 2 ) is even 1 1 -hard 15] .
For two-variable xed-point logic, a little more work is required. We actually prove the undecidability for a weaker system, that just extends FO 2 by well-foundedness assertions about compositions of binary relations. Recall that a pre-well-ordering is a well-founded, irre exive and transitive relation <, for which the induced relation x y , (:x < y^:y < x) is a congruence. Equivalently, think of as a congruence for <, such that the quotient < = is a well-ordering. (iii) The composition < is well-founded. For the obvious direction note that, if (A; <; ) is a pre-well-ordering, then < = <, so that (iii) is clearly satis ed. Conversely, assume that (A; <; ) satis es (i) { (iii). By (i), is symmetric, and (A; <; ) satis es a trichotomy property: 8x8y ?
x < y _ y < x _ x y . As is re exive, (iii) clearly implies in particular that < itself (as well as < and <) is well-founded, as these compositions are included in < . This implies that the trichotomy is strict in the sense that the alternative is exclusive. It su ces to show now that < is transitive and closed under on the left and on the right ( < = < = <; i.e. is a congruence for <).
Transitivity. Suppose that a 1 < a 2 < a 3 . By trichotomy, it su ces to exclude the possibilities a 3 < a 1 (which would violate well-foundedness of <) and a 1 a 3 (which would violate well-foundedness of < by a 1 < a 2 a 2 < a 3 a 1 ).
Invariance under . Suppose, for instance, that a 1 < a 2 a 3 . We want to show that a 1 < a 3 , again by excluding the other possibilities: a 3 < a 1 would violate wellfoundedness of <
, and a 1 a 3 would violate well-foundedness of < .
2
Since the equivalence relation induced by a pre-well-ordering < is FO 2 -de nable from < and, conversely, every equivalence relation is induced by a pre-well-ordering (choose a well-ordering of the equivalence classes), we infer the following result. Again the satis ability problems for these systems are actually 1 1 -hard. A direct application of Lemma 3.17 moreover shows that also the fragment of FP 2 that corresponds to the extension of L by universal FO 2 -sentences without equality is undecidable 23].
Another interesting family of extensions of L are the k-dimensional -calculi. They have been introduced by Otto 28] who shows that these languages can express precisely those properties of Kripke structures that are invariant under bisimulation and decidable in polynomial time. Unfortunately, these languages do not inherit the nice algorithmic properties of L : already the satis ability of the two-dimensional -calculus is highly undecidable 28].
3.5 Well-orderings and CL 2 The following problems are recursively equivalent (both in their general and in their nitistic versions): { the FO 2 -theory of several built-in well-founded relations; { the FO 2 -theory of several built-in well-orderings; { the satis ability problem for CL 2 .
That well-orderings and arbitrary well-founded relations carry the same power for the issue of FO 2 -satis ability is a consequence of the fact that (i) E is well-founded if and only if there is a well-ordering < such that E <.
(ii) a well-founded relation < is a well-ordering if and only if it satis es the FO 2 -axiom of trichotomy 8x8y ? x = y _ x < y _ y < x .
It remains to link CL 2 with FO 2 over well-founded relations. In one direction this connection easily follows from the fact that well-foundedness of a relation E is expressible in CL 2 through 8x
? Eyx] 1 ? , corresponding to the universally quanti ed, generalized CTL-formula 8(E ?1 -paths p)(>until?).
In the other direction we have to show that there is a recursive reduction of CL 2 -satis ability to the FO 2 -theory of several well-founded relations. Skipping the usual Skolemization procedure which introduces new predicates for subformulae, we need only consider CL 2 -formulae 1 It is not hard to check that 1 is also as desired for (b) over all structures that interpret E 1 as a well-founded relation.
Turning to 2 , let S, in some B, be the set of vertices that satisfy 2 . Let S = S S , where the S are the stages of the least xed point associated with 2 Moreover, 2 is indeed as desired in (b), in forcing S to capture the semantics of 2 over all structures in which E 2 is well-founded.
The following results about the behaviour of FO 2 over well-founded relations are quite recent and will be fully treated elsewhere 31].
Theorem 3.20 (Otto) The FO 2 -theory of one built-in well-ordering and the FO 2 -theory of one built-in nite linear order are decidable in Co-Nexptime. On the other hand, the FO 2 -theory of several built-in well-orderings is strongly undecidable.
As indicated above, well-orderings may be replaced by arbitrary well-founded relations without a ecting the statements of the last theorem. Remark. The observation that the embedding of propositional modal logic into FO 2 does not really explain the robustness and the nice algorithmic and model-theoretic properties of modal logics (see also 38] in this context) has lead to the study of another fragment of rst-order logic, the so-called guarded fragment. Here the number of variables and the arities of the relation symbols are not restricted, but only a restricted form of quanti cation (relativized by atoms) is allowed. It seems that the guarded fragment indeed shares many of the nice properties of modal logics (see 1, 4, 5, 13] ). In particular it has both the nite model property and (a generalized variant of) the tree model property.
Model checking in two variables
We have seen that the satis ability problems for two-variable logics with full rst-order quanti cation such as FO 2 , TC 2 , CL 2 or FP 2 are much harder (and indeed undecidable in most cases) than the satis ability problems for corresponding modal logics such as ML, CTL or L . Our point in this section is that for model checking problems the situation is di erent: in all cases that we consider, the model checking problem of a modal logic has essentially the same complexity as the model checking problem of the corresponding two variable logic with full quanti cation. In fact, we can even drop the restriction to two variables, and admit instead any bounded number of variables without a signi cant increase of complexity.
Complexity issues for model checking. The model checking problem for a logic L, denoted MC(L), is the following: Given a formula 2 L and an appropriate nite structure A (including, if necessary, constants interpreting the free variables of ), determine whether A j = .
There are di erent possibilities to study the complexity of model checking problems. The general measure is the combined complexity. Here both the structure and the formula are considered as variable inputs for MC(L) and the complexity is measured in terms of the combined length of both inputs. But in many cases it makes sense to x either the formula or the structure and measure the complexity just in terms of the other input. If the formula is xed, and complexity is measured in terms of the length (essentially: the cardinality) of the structure, then we speak of the structure complexity 6 of MC(L). The structure complexity is meaningful and important because in many situations, the formula (i.e. the query or the speci cation) is rather short but the structure (the database to be queried or the program to be veri ed) may be huge. On the other hand, if the structure is xed and only the formula varies, we speak of the expression complexity 7 . In more classical terms, the expression complexity of a logic L on a xed structure A is just the complexity of the L-theory of A.
Our default here will be the combined complexity. Whenever we consider the structure complexity or the expression complexity, this will be mentioned explicitly.
Aside Consider once more the semantically distinguished elds of two-variable logics, which were characterized in section 1.2 by invariance under bisimulation and two-pebble equivalence (with or without counting). It is a curious phenomenon that, within each of the corresponding maximal logics ML 1 , graded ML 1 , L 2 1! , and C 2 1! , recursive syntax can be given to fragments that are semantically complete for Ptime structure complexity within that eld. These capturing results point at a very special nature of the two-variable scenarios also with respect to descriptive complexity 29]. Ptime within the bisimulation invariant, modal world, for instance, is captured by a higher-dimensional variant of L 28]. 6 In the context of database application or automatic veri cation one also uses the terms data complexity or program complexity.
Model checking for modal logic and FO k .
The model checking problem for rst-order logic is well known to be Pspace-complete. We explain this result and draw some conclusions for modal logic and the boundedvariable fragments of rst-order logic.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of an alternating algorithm and we will use the facts that Alogspace = P and Aptime = Pspace 8 .
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to formulae in positive normal form. This means that all negations are driven inwards and occur only in front of atomic formulae. Recall that a literal is an atomic formula or its negation. To check whether A j = (a 1 ; : : : ; a m ) for a given rst-order formula (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ), a nite structure A, Here a a j is the tuple obtained from a by changing the j-th component to a or adding a as j-th component.
As every alternating procedure, this algorithm can be described more intuitively as a game between the existential and the universal player. In this case the game is the obvious model checking game that can also be used to de ne the semantics of rst- The alternating model checking procedure runs in time O(j j log n) and uses work space at most r log n + log j j, where n is the cardinality of A and r is the maximal number of free variables in any subformula of . Indeed, the structure A is never modi ed, so in any situation the procedure needs at most r log n bits to describe the current tuple and a pointer of length log j j to specify the current subformula of .
Together with the facts that alternating polynomial time coincides with deterministic polynomial space and that alternating logspace coincides with deterministic polynomial time, the following results follow immediately. 
It is a trivial consequence of the Pspace-completeness of quanti ed propositional logic that the rst-order theory of any structure with at least two elements is Pspacehard. Thus the expression complexity and hence also the combined complexity of rstorder model checking is Pspace-complete. Vardi 37] has proved that the model checking problems for FO k are P-complete, for all k > 3. We have a simple proof that the same holds for FO 2 , and in fact also for propositional modal logic ML. Proposition 4.2 The model-checking problem for ML is P-complete. As a consequence, the same holds for FO k for all k > 2.
Proof. ML is a sublogic of FO 2 and we have already seen that the model checking problem of FO k is in P for every xed k.
To prove hardness, we present a reduction from the GAME problem (see Example 1.4) to the model-checking problem for ML. Recall that an instance of the GAME problem is a Kripke structure A = (A; E) with a element a, and it is asked whether player I has a winning strategy for the two-player game on board A with one pebble and the following rules: Player I begins with the pebble at position a. The players alternate; in each move they bring the pebble from its current position along some E-edge to a next position. Who gets stuck rst, loses the game (the opponent wins).
We de ne a sequence of propositional modal formulae by ' 1 := 32?; ' i+1 := 32' i : Clearly A; a j = ' i if and only if player I has a strategy to win the game from a in at most i moves. Further, if player I has a winning strategy, then she also has a winning strategy in at most n moves, where n is the total number of positions in the game.
Thus, the function taking G = (A; a) to the pair (G; ' n ) is a logspace reduction from GAME to MC(ML).
2
Structure and expression complexity. The alternating procedure for rst-order model checking runs in alternating logarithmic time for xed formulae . A more sophisticated argument shows that also the expression complexity for FO k -model checking is in Alogtime (see 37]).
Polynomial-time model checking for extensions of FO k
We next consider the logics C k , the extensions of FO k by counting quanti ers 9 >m .
Recall that C k is a fragment of rst-order logic but there exists no function f : N ! N such that C k FO f(k) . With an appropriate modi cation of the model checking game for FO k we can show that also the C k admit e cient model checking algorithms.
Theorem 4.3 For every k > 2, the model checking problem for C k is P-complete.
Proof. We rst observe that we can easily reduce the model checking problem for C k to the case where the parameters m in the counting quanti ers 9 >m and 9 6m are bounded by the cardinality of the given structure. Indeed, given a formula ( x) 2 C k , and a structure A of cardinality n, replace for all m > n, the subformulae 9 >m x' of by ? and the subformulae 9 6m x' by >. Further we assume, without loss of generality, that the universe of the given structure A is of the form A = f1; : : : ; ng, and we slightly extend C k to allow expressions of the form (9 >m x j > a) and (9 6m x j > a) where a 2 A f0g. The value a = 0 is admitted so that we can rewrite statements 9 >m x j '
with unrelativized counting quanti ers by relativized quanti ers (9 >m x j > 0)'. We can thus assume that all counting quanti ers are relativized.
We extend the alternating procedure ModCheck('; A; a) given in the previous section by rules applying to subformulae of the form (9 >m x j > a)' or (9 6m x j > a)'. We use the game description of the model checking procedure: at a position given by a formula (9 >m x j > a)' and a tuple b the existential player selects a value c > a for x j . The universal player now has two options (if m > 2): she can either challenge c or accept c. To challenge c means that she moves to the position ('; b c j ). Thus, in the rest of the game, the existential player has to prove that c was a valid choice for x j . But (unless m = 1) the universal player also has the option to accept c and to force her opponent to produce a next value for x j . In that case c becomes the new value of a (i.e. perform the update a := c) and the game proceeds at the position given by ((9 >m?1 x j > a)'; b). The rules for formulae (9 6m x j > a)' are analogous.
It is clear that the existential player has a winning strategy for the modi ed game ModCheck( ; A; a) if and only if A j = ( a). Further, the game only requires logarithmic space. Indeed only one relativized quanti er (9 >m x j > a) is treated at a time, so, compared to the model checking game for FO k , only two additional variables storing the current values of m and a are needed. Hence the total space required by the game is bounded by (2 + k) log n + log j j. This proves that the model checking problem for C k is solvable in alternating logspace, hence in deterministic polynomial time. 2
It is known that the model checking problem for CTL is in P 9] . Also the model checking problems for the bounded-variable transitive closure logics TC k are solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.4 For all k > 2, the model checking problem for TC k (and hence in particular for CL 2 ) is P-complete.
Proof. It only remains to be shown that the problems are in P. For simplicity, we just consider TC 2 . On a xed structure A we need to look only for paths of length bounded by the cardinality of A, so we can rewrite a formula (TC ')(x; y) as ' (n) (x; y), saying that there exists a '-path of length at most n from x to y. Due to the problem of nested TC-operators, we avoid giving a direct reduction to the model checking problem for some FO k (which would be possible for k = 3 if a graph representation of the formulae is used). Instead we describe the necessary modi cations of the model checking game. This result has rst been established explicitly in 11] and 7]. A very nice proof based on a model checking game for L has been given by Stirling 35] . This model checking game was in fact discovered earlier by Herwig 19] , and Theorem 4.5 is implicit in 19].
Although the model checking game for L is (in some sense) a logspace game it is not clear whether the associated strategy problem is solvable in deterministic polynomialtime. The reason is that the game does not always reach a nal position; instead it may get into an in nite loop. To deal with this case the de nition of the winning conditions has to be extended, depending on whether the outermost xed-point formula on the loop is a least or a greatest xed point (for details see 19, 35] ). As a result the question whether the existential player has a winning strategy is not know to be in P. However, it can be shown to be in NP. Therefore the model checking problem for L is in NP, and since the -calculus is closed under negation it also is in Co-NP.
Remark. Unlike the case for propositional modal logic ML, it is not hard to see that also the data complexity and the expression complexity of L are P-hard.
The natural question arises, whether FP 2 is more complicated to check than the -calculus. The next result shows that this is not the case. We can even reduce the model checking problems for more general bounded-variable xed-point logics to the -calculus.
De nition 4. Proof. We present a reduction which, given a nite structure A = (A; R 1 ; : : : ; R m ) and a formula (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) 2 LFP k , produces a Kripke structure K with universe A k and a formula 2 L such that for all a 2 A k A j = ( a) () (K; a) j = :
Every relation R of A is represented by a unary relation R of K such that R = f a 2 A k : (a 1 ; : : : ; a s ) 2 Rg where s is the arity of R (we can assume that s 6 k). Further K has for all i; j 2 f1; : : : ; kg unary relations I ij = f a 2 A k : a i = a j g. This result was rst established in 37] by a di erent method. It should however be noted that there also exists a more powerful (and perhaps more natural) variant of xed-point logic with k variables, permitting rst-order parameters inside xed points. This means that given a formula '(X; x; y) we can build a xed-point formula of the form LFP X; x '(X; x; y)]( z; y):
This more powerful variant can apparently not be reduced to the -calculus. In fact, Dziembowski 10] showed, that even in the two-variable case the free parameters inside nested xed points can be used to simulate arbitrary sequences of Boolean variables. Thus the model checking of quanti ed Boolean formulae is reducible to this liberalized variant of FP 2 .
Theorem 4.9 (Dziembowski) For every k > 2, the model checking problem for kvariable xed-point logic with parameters is Pspace-complete. Indeed, there exists a very simple structure B (just a set with three elements) such that the expression complexity of the liberalized FP 2 on B is Pspace-complete.
